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Artikel ini membahas bagaimana kepentingan aktor politik di dalam suatu negara dapat 
memicu konflik dan rekonsiliasi dengan negara lain. Studi kasus konflik antara Kam-
boja dan Thailand terkait Kuil Preah Vihear pada tahun 2008-2011 ini memperlihatkan 
bagaimana perbedaan kepentingan elite politik pada masing-masing negara membuat 
dinamika hubungan kedua negara naik dan turun dalam hal konflik dan rekonsiliasi. 
Dengan mendiskusikan bagaimana kepentingan Perdana Menteri Kamboja Hun Sen 
bersama Cambodian’s People Party (CPP) dan Perdana Menteri Thailand Abhisit Vej-
jajiva bersama Democracy Party (PD) yang kemudian digantikan oleh Yingluck Shina-
watra bersama Partai Pheu Thai, artikel ini berargumen bahwa konflik Preah Vihear 
telah dijadikan alat oleh aktor politik kedua negara tersebut untuk kepentingan politik 
dalam negeri mereka. Berdasarkan studi ini, dinamika suatu konflik perbatasan pada 
dasarnya dapat ditentukan oleh kepentingan aktor politik yang memiliki tujuan untuk 
mendapatkan kekuasaan di negara masing-masing. Dengan memberikan penekanan 
kepada kepentingan aktor politik secara domestik, studi ini memberikan dimensi yang 
berbeda dari penelitian-penelitian sebelumnya yang cenderung menjelaskan konflik 
Preah Vihear secara deskriptif dengan membahas sejarah serta kronologis dari konflik 
tersebut.
Kata Kunci: kepentingan, aktor, perbedaan kepentingan, konflik, kekuasaan.
ABSTRACT
This paper examines how domestic interest of political actors in particular country 
may spark conflict and create reconciliation with other country. The case of the Preah 
Vihear border temple dispute between Cambodia and Thailand in 2008-2011 shows 
that distinctive political interest within each country has made the the relation of both 
countries in up and down situation, in term of escalating conflict or initiating reconci-
liation, in that period of time. By discussing the interest of Cambodia’s political actor 
represented by Prime Minister Hun Sen with the Cambodian’s People Party (CPP) and 
Thailand’s elites represented by Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva with the Democracy 
Party (PD) and, later, by Yingluck Shinawatra with the Pheu Thai Party, the article argues 
that Preah Vihear conflict has been used by these political actors for their domestic 
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political gains. Based on this study, it can be concluded that a border conflict can be 
basically influenced by political actor interest to maintain or gain domestic power. By 
underlining the domestic political actor interest, this study gives a different dimension 
compare to other studies at the same topic that tend to explain the conflict by using 
descriptive or chronolical approach.
Keywords: interest, actor, difference of interests, conflict, power.
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INTRODUCTION
Conflicts between states tend to occur when land and sea boundar-
ies between them are uncertain and open to interpretation. Border dis-
putes are common causes of interstate conflicts across the world (Putra, 
Utomo, & Windiani 2013, 2). In international politics, border conflicts 
may result in poor bilateral relations and trigger armed combat, which 
may cost lives. The discrete interests of each country’s domestic politi-
cal actors are a major reason for border conflicts (Sothirak 2013). The 
border conflict between Cambodia and Thailand, better known as the 
Preah Vihear temple border dispute, represents one such discord that 
stemmed from the divergence of domestic political interests in Asia.
This study focuses on the interests of the Prime Ministers of Cam-
bodia and Thailand in the context of the Preah Vihear temple conflict 
that occurred between 2008 and 2011. Thailand’s domestic politics 
heavily influenced for this border conflict. Thailand’s Democracy Party 
(PD), its People Alliance for Democracy (PAD), and its “yellow shirts” 
incited the Thai people to claim the Preah Vihear temple is Thailand’s 
national pride that it must be brought within Thailand’s territory. This 
provocation succeeded in arousing the Thai people’s anger.
On the other hand, the Cambodian political actors, Hun Sen and 
the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), were also interested in maintain-
ing their power. They took advantage of the dispute to foment discord 
between the two countries, and some people were killed during the 
ensuing clashes (Nugraha 2011, 6). Increasing casualties and material 
losses then changed the Cambodian and Thai state actors’ motivations, 
and they formed a common interest in expending serious efforts, both 
bilaterally and through the process of mediation, to resolve the Preah 
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Vihear conflict. Interestingly, when reconciliation occurred, the Thai 
Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva was replaced by Yingluck Shinawatra. 
The 2008-2011 Preah Vihear conflict was different from previous con-
flicts between the two countries because political actors on both sides of 
the border were responsible for both the emergence and the resolution 
of the dispute. This study will examine the manner in which the mo-
tives of Cambodian and Thai political actors influenced the 2008-2011 
Preah Vihear Temple conflict.
Most previous studies discussing this conflict (Irewati et al. 2015; 
Raharjo 2013) have only explicated its causes and described its progres-
sion through details on its history and chronology without analyzing 
internal and external factors, such as political actors and border issues. 
A few studies that did include explanations on discrete actors’ incen-
tives with regard to the border issues also do not explain how these 
actors’ different interests triggered the conflict (Choi 2014; Salla 1997; 
Paradhisa 2012).
This study intends to contribute to studies of conflict by examining 
the political actors’ motives. The dispute began when the Preah Vihear 
temple became a strategy for Hun Sen’s bid to maintain power and gain 
public support in the Cambodian election because he was concerned 
about the CPP’s declining vote in the 2008 elections. On the other side 
of the border, Thai political actors used the issue of Cambodia’s entry 
of Preah Vihear as part of its world heritage to instigate Abhisit Vej-
jajiva’s act of overthrowing the Samak Sundaravej government, which 
had supported Cambodia and UNESCO. Yingluck Shinawatra, who 
wanted to become Prime Minister of Thailand, also used this conflict 
for his political ends, handling the issue aggressively on behalf of the 
country and making it drag on for three years.
CONFLICT AS M A NIFESTATION OF FR ICTION 
A ND OF THE LEGITIM ATION OF INTER ESTS
Pruit and Rubin (2004) define conflict as friction that arises be-
cause of differences in interests or beliefs among a number of parties 
or actors that cannot be resolved. Pruit and Rubin argue that interests 
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are caused by the desires of the parties or actors and are realized in 
thoughts and actions. Interests, thus, form the core of the behaviors, 
goals, and intentions of people. The varied actors and parties on discrete 
sides of an issue are driven to respond or to behave in a certain manner 
to avoid interference with the actualization of their interests. In reality, 
the diverse actors’ divergent interests create dissatisfaction if obstacles 
stemming from the interests of one party prevent the realization of the 
interests of another party (Pruit & Rubin 2004).
From a political perspective, conflicts arise due to differences in 
the interests of political actors who have specific power-related goals. 
Power is a primary concern in politics since it promotes prestige and 
allows freedom and broad access to more resources compared to those 
who do not hold political power or position. It is undeniable that gov-
ernment administrators’ political positions help them meet and realize 
their interests and aspirations, both from the psychological and mate-
rial standpoints. Thus, political players are inclined to fight for their 
interests despite having to face conflict.
Silverman (2011) argues that the border conflict between Thailand 
and Cambodia occurred because of historical issues and their relevance 
to forming the two countries’ national identities, tourism interests, and 
political legitimacy. Further, control of the area became a manifesta-
tion of Cambodia legitimacy as a nation, strengthening the desire on 
the Cambodian side to acquire territories that were considered “lost” 
(Silverman 2011; Ngoun 2017).
Most researchers, such as Pongsudhirak (2011), Sothirak (2013), and 
Ngoun (2017), state that the border conflicts resulted from the rise in 
nationalist sentiments in the two countries because of domestic politics. 
Further, the dispute also threatened ASEAN’s integrity. This article will 
reference Pruit and Rubin’s conceptual framework and align with the 
notion that conflict occurs and is strengthened by policies devised by 
political rulers to achieve their individual and administrative interests. 
In the context of the present paper, the author argues the Prime Minis-
ters of Thailand and Cambodia, who were supposed to resolve conflicts, 
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actually used the issues and disputes to gain and maintain power. Thus, 
conflict resolution became increasingly difficult.
R ESEA RCH METHODOLOGY
This study uses the qualitative method to review scholarly literature 
as material for analysis. Books, journals, articles, and reports/texts from 
the two countries’ embassies in Jakarta were used as sources to examine 
the historical and chronological aspects of the Cambodia-Thailand bor-
der conflict. The data were triangulated through interviews with schol-
ars and reseachers at the Indonesian Research Institute (LIPI) that have 
extensive knowledge on the topic. The relationship pattern between the 
data variables was analyzed after all the data were collected, and the 
investigation results were subsequently associated with the conceptual 
framework mentioned above.
INTER ESTS OF POLITICA L ACTORS IN CA MBODI A -
TH A IL A ND PR EA H V IHEA R TEMPLE CONFLICT
Border conflicts between countries essentially involve several actors 
both directly and indirectly. The motives of each actor generally differ. 
These divergent interests can potentially cause conflict. According to 
Pruit and Rubin’s theory of conflict, discord can occur due to actors’ 
disparate interests. Conflict is eventually initiated at a stage when ac-
tors believe that their interests can be achieved. In addition, the actors’ 
interests may oppose each other, making it difficult for them to find 
alternatives to the varied interests that can later grow to become the 
root of the conflict.
The actors’ conflicting interests are caused by their desire to achieve 
a specific objective, as may be observed in the dynamics presented at 
the time of Abhisit Vejjajiva and Hun Sen and Yingluck Shinawatra 
and Hun Sen (EPPO 2011, 36). The Preah Vihear conflict became 
important to the political actors of both countries because the commu-
nities considered the temple a national icon of their cultural heritage 
that could provide certain benefits to the nations, especially in terms 
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of tourism. In addition, the Thai and Cambodian political actors made 
safeguarding the two countries’ sovereignty a supplementary issue of 
Preah Vihear temple conflict in an attempt to obtain public legitimacy.
INTER ESTS OF CA MBODI A N POLITICA L ACTORS
The interests of the Cambodian political actors Prime Minister Hun 
Sen and the CPP as the ruling party in Cambodia initially caused the 
border conflict of Preah Vihear temple. Hun Sen wanted to maintain 
his position as the Prime Minister of Cambodia, and the CPP wanted 
to remain Cambodia’s ruling party. A number of actions were taken to 
achieve these objectives, including financial support of the Cambodian 
military to garner increased support for Hun Sen and CPP in the guise 
of safeguarding Cambodia’s sovereignty in the face of tensions with 
Thailand. (Irewati et al. 2015, 60).
With almost three decades in the position, Hun Sen is Cambodia’s 
longest serving Prime Minister. Hun Sen is now 66, and his leadership 
tenure suggests that he may continue in this position for a much longer 
term. His special interest in the strategy of UNESCO’s recognition of 
Preah Vihear as a Cambodian world heritage site is undeniable, as is 
the CPP’s interest in maintaining its position as Cambodia’s primary 
political party (Irewati et al. 2015, 36).
The issue related to Preah Vihear temple appeared to be one of 
significant national pride for the Cambodian people; they seemed will-
ing to undergo the struggle of border disputes and submissions to the 
International Court of Justice, which declared the Preah Vihear temple 
was Cambodian territory in 1962. Hun Sen then used this decision to 
renew community support and win the 2008 Cambodian election. He 
argued for the need to maintain Cambodia’s sovereignty, retain the 
Preah Vihear temple’s cultural heritage against Thailand’s claims, and 
enable the Preah Vihear temple to become a Cambodian tourism icon. 
Such strategies are usually employed by national leaders to maintain 
their power, especially against imminent threats from other political 
actors (Robison 2013, 30).
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INTER ESTS OF TH A I POLITICA L ACTORS
Similarly, Thai political actors were also interested in taking advan-
tage of the Preah Vihear temple issue to gain power. The internal up-
heavals of Thai politics affected both the conflict and its resolution. An 
examination of the Preah Vihear dispute period includes the two Thai 
leaders who handled the conflict: Abhisit Vejjajiva of the Democracy 
Party, subsequently replaced by Yingluck Shinawatra of the Pheu Thai 
party. The change of political actors significantly changed the way the 
conflict was managed. Abhisit Vejjajiva’s interests led to escalation of 
the dispute, while Yingluck’s concerns mandated resolving the conflict.
INTER ESTS OF A BHISIT V EJJAJI VA 
A ND DEMOCR AC Y PA RT Y
Abhisit Vejjajiva replaced the People’s Power Party’s (PPP) interim 
Prime Minister, Somchai Wongsawat. Abhisit Vejjajiva belonged to the 
Democracy Party (PD), which wanted to become the ruling party of 
Thailand, while Abhisit Vejjajiva wanted to become the prime minister. 
Abhisit Vejjajiva and PD used the Preah Vihear issue to incite Thai 
nationalist sentiments against the PPP government of the time. The 
replacement of the prime minister began a new chapter in handling 
the Preah Vihear conflict. In addition, Abhisit Vejjajiva also attempted 
to obtain support from the PAD, a government pressure group in Thai-
land. The PAD, commonly called the yellow-shirt group (anti-Shinawa-
tra faction), shared the PD’s objectives of toppling the PPP from power.
The PD strategy, espoused by Abhisit Vejjajiva, was initiated through 
the censure of Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej and Foreign Minis-
ter Nappadon Pattama’s May 22, 2008 joint statement endorsing the 
legalization of Preah Vihear temple as a UNESCO world heritage 
site belonging to Cambodia. This decision was taken unilaterally and 
without discussion with the Minister of Defense or with Thai society 
(Irewati et al. 2015, 56). The PD and its supporters declared that Samak 
Sundaravej and Nappadon Pattam were had sold Thai sovereignty out 
through this consent. PPP infighting led to a number of Sundaravej’s 
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faults surfacing, and the yellow-shirt group provoked demonstrations to 
overthrow the ruling government. Sundaravej was temporarily replaced 
by fellow PPP member, Somchai Wongsawat. Increasingly murky in-
ternal politics in Thailand finally compelled the 2008 elections. Thai 
activists who joined the PAD Alliance also tried to enter the border 
area before the elections. They were captured by Cambodian troops; 
however, they successfully influenced the Thai people’s attitudes to-
ward the border region crisis between Cambodia and Thailand. This 
allowed Abhisit Vejjajiva to gain political support for the PD’s victory 
in the 2008 Election.
INTER ESTS OF Y INGLUCK SHINAWATR A A ND 
THE PR EA H V IHEA R TEMPLE CONFLICT
The Preah Vihear temple conflict caused the loss of many lives, 
much suffering, and tremendous material damage to Thailand. The 
lack of clarity in the conflict resolution forced the Pheu Thai Party 
and its leader, Yingluck Shinawatra, to stand against the Abhisit Vej-
jajiva government. It intended to restore the Pheu Thai Party to power 
and make Yingluck the prime minister. Yingluck was supported in this 
instance by the red-shirt group. Yingluck’s conduct was triggered by 
Abhisit Vejjajiva and the PD’s actions, which prioritized the govern-
ing party’s efforts to use the Preah Vihear temple conflict as a tool 
to achieve its interests regardless of the extent of the losses Thailand 
suffered. These actions resulted in public anger and wide-ranging dis-
appointment in Abhisit’s leadership. Diverse demonstrations and rebel-
lions began to emerge, and an atmosphere of political upheaval gripped 
Thailand as some of the largest protests caused significant casualties, 
especially between March and April 2010. Allegations that Abhisit Vej-
jajiva had failed to defend Thailand’s territorial sovereignty in the Preah 
Vihear disputed area inflamed the public until the demonstrators were 
finally subdued by the military, resulting in 92 deaths (International 
Crisis Group 2011, 1).
The rejection of the PAD was clearly expressed by order refugees 
who wrote peace posters. Moreover, the refugees also tried to prevent 
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any soldiers, weapons, and tanks from entering the disputed territory. 
They argued that the conflict would not end if armed contact contin-
ued around the Preah Vihear temple region (Oktria 2013). The actions 
taken by the Thai government under Abhisit Vejjajiva actually paralyzed 
life and became a threat for residents around the border area. Military 
involvement in handling the conflict also resulted in war between Cam-
bodia and Thailand.
Yingluck Shinawatra and the Pheu Thai Party took advantage of 
this opportunity to gain public support in the 2011 Thai elections. 
Yingluck and her party exploited the Thai people’s anger and espoused 
the theme of reconciliation to end the political crisis that had gone 
on since 2008. Yingluck claimed that Abhisit’s leadership only served 
to worsen Thailand’s relations with Cambodia, and that the reigning 
government’s coercive manner of dealing with the conflict had dam-
aged Thailand’s image in the global arena. In addition, the military 
presence behind Abhisit made the situation more volatile (Irewati et al. 
2015, 115). Yingluck’s campaign centered on the Preah Vihear temple 
conflict, and she promised to use non-violent diplomatic means to re-
solve the border dispute.
THE INTER ESTS OF A BHISIT V EJJAJI VA 
A ND HUN SEN IN INFLUENCING THE 2008 -
2011 PR EA H V IHEA R TEMPLE CONFLICT
The Preah Vihear temple was contested by Cambodia and Thailand 
in the 1950s; the dispute was resolved through the 1962 International 
Court decision. It resurfaced because of the interests of political actors 
of both countries and the resulting internal political upheavals. The 
conflict escalated when Hun Sen attempted to renew the Cambodian 
community’s support for registering the Preah Vihear temple with 
UNESCO as a Cambodian world heritage site in an effort to divert at-
tention from Cambodia’s economic decline due to the world economic 
crisis. Hun Sen felt that the political opposition, under the leadership 
of Sam Rainsy, had become a potential threat that could reduce CPP’s 
vote share in the 2008 Cambodian election (Plattes 2010, 36).
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Responding to Hun Sen’s actions in January 2008, Abhisit Vejjajiva 
and the PD opposed this move in Thailand with the goal of toppling 
the ruling Thai government since Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej 
had agreed with Hun Sen’s desire to register the Preah Vihear temple 
as a Cambodian heritage site with UNESCO. Tensions were rife in 
Thai politics after the 2006 coup, in which Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra was removed and his party, Thai Rak Thai, was dissolved. 
The leaders of Thai Rak Thai formed the PPP, which won a majority 
in the 2007 elections. Thus, Abhisit Vejjajiva and the PD were quick 
to take advantage when this sovereignty-related issue, said to oppose 
the Thai Constitution, emerged in 2008. They took joint action with 
Thai nationalists and the yellow-shirt group, securing victory for the 
PD. Abhisit Vejjajiva then became the new Thai Prime Minister (BBC 
News 2008). The interests of these actors are explained in detail in 
Table 1, which shows the differences in interests that created this border 
conflict.
Table 1 
Conflict of Interests of both Cambodian and Thai Political Actors
Factors Abhisit Vejjajiva Hun Sen
View of the ownership of Preah 
Vihear temple as Cambodia’s 
World Heritage 
A step to take over power from 
the PPP and Prime Ministers 
Samak Sundaravej and 
Somchai Wongsawat
An effort to defend power 
from the opposition’s threats 
and to win the 27 July 2008 
elections
Actors’ interests in the Preah 
Vihear temple Conflict 
Seize the Preah Vihear temple 
to become the Prime Minister 
Defend the Preah Vihear 
temple and retain power 
Actors’ goals in the 
achievement of their interests 
Become Thai Prime Minister Become Cambodian Prime 
Minister
Ownership of the disputed 
area of 4.6 km2
Claim that the area belongs to 
Thailand
Claim that the area belongs to 
Cambodia
Conflict resolution with regard 
to the Preah Vihear temple
Bilateral and coercive means Involve third parties
Observers from Indonesia Reject Accept
Response to the decision of 
the International Court of 
Justice 
Reject Accept
Source: Processed from several sources by the author
The difficulty of finding alternatives to these different interests 
formed the basis for the conflict, as became clear when Abhisit Vej-
jajiva became the Thai Prime Minister. The military played a greater 
role in the Thai government and deployed 2,000 troops to the contested 
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area. This move increased the intensity of armed combat between the 
two countries, which began with 100 Thai soldiers crossing the border 
near the Preah Vihear temple on March 25, 2009. Hun Sen received 
this report and reminded Abhisit Vejjajiva, on March 31, 2009, that 
Cambodian soldiers would wage war if Thai troops were discovered 
crossing the border (Karisma 2013, 50). Abhisit Vejjajiva denied Hun 
Sen’s claim, saying that the Thai soldiers were merely guarding the 
border region and that, in fact, the Cambodian army had crossed the 
border and caused the armed contact.
Disputes between the two prime ministers continued as Hun Sen 
appointed Thaksin Shinawatra as Cambodia’s economic adviser on 
October 27, 2009. In response, Abhisit Vejjajiva alleged that Hun Sen 
was attempting to interfere in internal Thai affairs because Thaksin 
Shinawatra was a fugitive who had been found guilty in absentia by 
Thailand’s judiciary. On November 5, 2009, Abhisit Vejjajiva ordered 
the Thai foreign ministry to recall the Thai ambassador to Cambodia. 
He also issued a statement that Thailand would discontinue bilateral 
relations with Cambodia. Hun Sen reciprocated in similar vein, recall-
ing the Cambodian ambassador to Thailand (Karisma 2013, 52).
Tensions intensified through 2010, with soldiers of both countries 
engaging in high intensity gunfire. The hostilities were also aggravated 
by mutually accusatory statements by the militaries of the two countries 
about who initiated firing until armed contact finally occurred. The 
armed combat affected the surrounding areas, silencing community 
activities and causing fear among people living along the borders. Gun-
fire continued until the beginning of 2011, when the political actors of 
the two states started thinking seriously about reconciliation (Hughes 
2010, 98).
Hun Sen then initiated bilateral negotiations with Abhisit Vejjajiva 
in both Cambodia and Thailand, which were not fruitful even though 
some meetings took place. Hun Sen also sought UN assistance to re-
solve the Preah Vihear temple conflict, but Thailand rejected this pro-
posal. The UN insisted the case must be resolved at the regional level, 
and the two countries eventually agreed to involve ASEAN as a third 
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party. As the ASEAN chair, Indonesia was appointed mediator, and its 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marty Natalegawa, attempted to facilitate 
a meeting entitled The Thailand-Cambodia Joint Commission on the 
Demarcation of the Land Boundary (JBC) at the Presidential Palace in 
Bogor, Indonesia on 7 and 8 April, 2011 (Robison 2013, 76). However, 
the meeting did not yield results because only the Secretary to the 
Foreign Minister attended from the Thai side, and he could not take 
decisions without discussions with the Thai Foreign Minister and with 
Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva.
The absence of good faith on Abhisit Vejjajiva’s part made Hun 
Sen file a case at the International Court of Justice on 28 April 2011, 
asking for a reinterpretation of the 1962 decision to resolve the dispute 
pertaining to the 4.6 km2 area and for a decision on the Thai military’s 
withdrawal from the disputed region (Raharjo 2013). Obviously, Abhisit 
Vejjajiva and the Thai military reacted negatively to Hun Sen’s move. 
Thus, the meetings conducted by Abhisit Vejjajiva and Hun Sen at the 
ASEAN Summit in Jakarta actually elevated tensions and did not put 
an end to the conflict. Over time, the opinions of the two countries, 
represented by their Foreign Affairs ministries, were heard by the In-
ternational Court in Hague on May 30 and 31, 2011.
Essentially, the changing interests of the political actors who caused 
the Preah Vihear conflict within the two countries finally led to rec-
onciliation. In Cambodia, Hun Sen came under pressure to resolve 
the conflict from the Cambodian opposition, considering the expense 
of recruiting and deploying more troops to match the number of Thai 
troops (Wagener 2011). Hun Sen was considered incapable of handling 
the dispute that had cost a lot of money, both for the soldiers and for 
repairing the damage caused by the border conflict (Irewati et al. 2015, 
185). Hun Sen thus became interested in the early resolution of the 
conflict to retain his power, which was under threat from Cambodian 
opposition parties.
On the Thai side, Abhisit Vejjajiva was also under pressure from 
the yellow-shirt group; he was being labeled too weak to resolve the 
dispute. There were increasing demands for concrete action to end the 
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increasingly protracted conflict that had been detrimental to Thailand’s 
interests. More, the Thai people, especially in the border area, also re-
pudiated Abhisit Vejjajiva and PD through written posters that asked for 
peace. The public argued that Abhisit’s leadership had only made the 
conflict worse, and that they wanted a non-violent, diplomatic solution.
INTER ESTS OF Y INGLUCK SHINAWATR A A ND 
HUN SEN IN THE R ECONCILI ATION OF 2008 -
2011 PR EA H V IHEA R TEMPLE CONFLICT
The military’s involvement in the conflict was actually detrimental 
to both countries, and this later became the basis for Yingluck Shinawa-
tra’s campaign to resolve the dispute through diplomacy and without 
violence. Hun Sen immediately congratulated Yingluck Shinawatra af-
ter her ascension, stating that her victory represented hope for the reso-
lution of the conflict to restore and improve bilateral relations (Kompas.
com 2011). The bilateral relations between Cambodia and Thailand 
were indeed disrupted when the Thai government was controlled by 
PD. Thaksin Shinawatra’s period of governance had increased bilateral 
cooperation between Cambodia and Thailand, and Hun Sen hoped 
that the Shinawatra family leadership’s return to the Thai government 
would again yield the same outcome.
Hun Sen’s positive response to Yingluck Shinawatra’s victory was 
also based on his interest in reconciliation because of internal pressures 
from Cambodia’s opposition parties. He argued that the reconciliation 
process would be easier with Yingluck Shinawatra, given the close rela-
tions between Hun Sen and the Shinawatra family. In addition, Hun 
Sen also believed that, unlike Abhisit Vejjajiva, Yingluck Shinawatra 
would comply with the International Court’s ruling without protest or 
violent actions involving deployment of the army.
The congruence of the two leaders’ goals and the close relation-
ship between Yingluck Shinawatra and Hun Sen were very helpful to 
the process of resolving the Preah Vihear temple dispute. Both sides 
demonstrated their willingness to reconcile by withdrawing all troops 
from the disputed area. The Indonesian monitoring team entered the 
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conflict zone after the interim decision of the International Court on 
July 18, 2011. Yingluck Shinawatra respected Hun Sen’s decision to file 
the case with the International Court of Justice to interpret the 1962 
decision because she felt that the action would dampen the tensions 
between the two parties.
Yingluck Shinawatra and Hun Sen’s mutual decision to demilita-
rize the Preah temple area brought real changes to the conflict resolu-
tion process. People living along the borders began to return to their 
homes and carry out their daily activities after the military troops left 
the area. People from both countries, especially those inhabiting the 
border region, began to feel the positive consequences of the reconcilia-
tory efforts of Yingluck Shinawatra and Hun Sen. Public trust in their 
leadership began to increase with the end of armed combat between 
Cambodia and Thailand.
Yingluck Shinawatra and Hun Sen also attempted to understand the 
impact of the conflict, especially in terms of economics. Yingluck Shi-
nawatra’s business experience and her expertise in economics made her 
more conscious that the conflict had affected trade. The average vol-
ume of Cambodian-Thai trade before the conflict was 234 million US 
dollars per year, making Thailand the largest importer of Cambodian 
products. Cambodia was one of the most important export destinations 
for Thai products. Thailand exported fuel, vehicles and spare parts, 
chemicals, sugar, plastics, processed foods, and construction materials 
to Cambodia. On the other hand, Cambodia exported clothing, ply-
wood, and other connected products to Thailand (Murshid & Sokphally 
2005, 32). It is undeniable that the conflict caused a drastic decline in 
the exports and imports of the two countries. Yingluck Shinawatra ex-
plained the above situation to Hun Sen during her visit to Cambodia, 
and Hun Sen responded positively. Both sides immediately began to 
take steps to improve bilateral cooperation.
Hun Sen believed that Yingluck Shinawatra would be able to im-
prove economic cooperation and would restore cooperation to pre-con-
flict levels. Hun Sen’s trust also hinged on the fact that Yingluck’s elder 
brother, Thaksin Shinawatra, had been Hun Sen’s trusted economic 
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adviser for Cambodia in 2009. In addition to export and import, Yin-
gluck Shinawatra and Hun Sen also talked about strengthening tourism 
in both countries, especially travel between Cambodia and Thailand.
The measures taken by Yingluck Shinawatra and Hun Sen actually 
served to reconcile the disputes between the two neighboring nations. 
The bilateral relations between Cambodia and Thailand also improved 
as the number of tourists from both Thailand and Cambodia visiting 
each other’s countries increased by 90% (Bangkok Post 2012). After the 
decline of tensions over the Preah Vihear temple, Yingluck Shinawatra 
became interested in making Pheu Thai the main party in Thailand by 
improving Thailand’s foreign policy, especially with regard to its neigh-
boring countries. On the Cambodian side, Hun Sen strengthened com-
munity support for himself and the CPP, specifically with the motive 
of victory in the next election. It became increasingly apparent that the 
positive bilateral attitudes vis-à-vis the border issues and the economic 
commitments made to each other by Cambodia and Thailand could 
only occur because of the personal associations between the prevailing 
regime in Cambodia and the Shinawatra family-led Thai government 
(Irewati et al. 2015, 154). The interests of Yingluck Shinawatra and Hun 
Sen may be explained through the following table:
Table 2 
Interests of both Political Actors in the Conflict Reconciliation
Factors Yingluck Shinawatra Hun Sen
View toward the ownership 
of Preah Vihear temple as 
Cambodia’s World Heritage
Refer to the decision of the 
International Court of Justice 
Refer to the decision of the 
International Court of Justice 
Actors’ interest in the conflict 
reconciliation 
Seize the power of government 
party 
Maintain the power
Actors’ goal in meeting their 
interests
Become Thai Prime Minister Become Cambodia Prime 
Minister
Ownership of Disputed Area of 
4.6 km2
Claim that the area belongs 
to Thailand but agree to the 
decision of the International 
Court of Justice 
Claim that the area belongs 
to Cambodia but agree to the 
decision of the International 
Court of Justice 
Conflict Resolution of the Preah 
Vihear temple
Bilateral negotiation and 
involve third parties 
Involve third parties
Observer from Indonesia Accept Accept
Actors’ response to the decision 
of the International Court of 
Justice
Accept Accept
Source: Processed from several sources by the author.
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Table 2 demonstrates fewer differences in the interests of the po-
litical actors on both sides. Thus, the conflict resolution process be-
came easier. Yingluck Shinawatra and Hun Sen succeeded in reducing 
tensions and peacefully resolving the longstanding conflict. Yingluck 
Shinawatra’s openness to the International Court of Justice decision 
later became the foundation for the settlement of Preah Vihear temple 
conflict. Yingluck Shinawatra and Hun Sen undertook varied negotia-
tions to find solutions for the different interests until a common goal 
was achieved.
The chart provided below shows the analysis of the events and in-
dicates that the conflict emerged with the divergent interests of Abhisit 
Vejjajiva and Hun Sen and was later resolved as the internal political 
incentives of Yingluck Shinawatra and Hun Sen changed to demand 
reconciliation.
Chart 1 
Different Interests among Actors in Preah Vihear Temple Border Conflict
Abhisit Vejjajiva’s interest in 
taking over prime ministerial 
power and in making the Democrat 
Party the ruling party of Thailand
Hun Sen’s interest in retaining 
power as the Prime Minister and in 
sustaining CPP as the ruling party 
of Cambodia 
The fight for Preah Vihear Temple
Hun Sen’s interest in retaining 
power as Prime Minister and 
sustaining CPP as the ruling party 
of Cambodia 
Yingluck Shinawatra’s interest in 
becoming Thai Prime Minister and 
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CONCLUSION
This study explains how domestic politics and the interests of politi-
cal actors influence conflict. We examine the ways in which the con-
flict was aggravated by the interests of political actors in two countries: 
a historical issue, the concept of sovereignty, and electoral interests.
In Cambodia, Hun Sen intended to retain public support and to pre-
serve his position of power as the Prime Minister of Cambodia. In Thai-
land, clear differences of perspective were observed between Yingluck 
Shinawatra and Abhisit Vejjajiva with respect to the border problem. 
Abhisit Vejjajiva made the border dispute and the Preah Vihear temple 
an issue of sovereignty, which inflamed the conflict. This perspective 
changed when Yingluck Shinawatra became the Prime Minister, and 
reconciliation began with initiating communication with Hun Sen.
Bilateral negotiations between the two countries were unsuccessful 
because of the lack of trust between the two parties. The Cambodian 
government did not really trust Thailand when military threats were 
used more than diplomacy. On the other hand, the existence of PAD 
and its military presence in Thailand forced the government to be more 
violent toward Cambodia, making agreement more difficult to achieve. 
Despite high expectations from ASEAN, the norms that prioritize con-
sensus and non-interference caused ASEAN’s role in the reconciliation 
to be limited. ASEAN can contribute to mediation or referee conflicts 
only when there is goodwill and trust between parties.
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